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Abstract
Using a simple duopoly model with endogenous order of moves, this study provides a
potential explanation for why rms might pay their employees a higher wage than rival
rms or the market-clearing rate: Setting a higher wage can serve as a commitment to
obtain the preferred order of moves in subsequent price competition. This holds even if the
wage increase does not enhance worker productivity or eciency. Simultaneous wage setting
admits no pure strategy Nash equilibrium, as their best responses form a cycle wherein
rms repeatedly overbid in wages to preempt the preferred position in price competition.
Sequential wage setting leads to wage dispersion even among homogeneous workers and
rms: the wage-setting leader oers a high wage such that the rival rm would not want
to overbid in equilibrium. In contrast, in quantity competition, duopolists have no such
incentives because, ceteris paribus, a rm that pays a wage higher than the competitor will
be unsuccessful in obtaining rst-mover advantages in subsequent quantity competition.
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1 Introduction
There are several theories explaining why rms pay more than the market-clearing wage rate.
The eciency-wage hypothesis suggests that rms do so to elicit greater worker eort (e.g.,
Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) or to reduce costly labor turnover (e.g., Stiglitz 1974). The gift-
exchange hypothesis suggests that rms may oer wages above the market-clearing rate as a
gift to induce reciprocal worker eort (e.g., Akerlof 1982). Union-rm wage bargaining may also
raise a wage rate above the market-clearing level (e.g., McDonald and Solow 1981).
In this study, we provide another theoretical rationale for why rms might pay their employees
a higher wage than the market-clearing rate or more than their rival rm does: increasing wage
rates can give the rm the advantageous order of moves in future competition. This holds even
when the wage increase is just a transfer from employers to employees, meaning that it does not
enhance worker productivity.
We adopt a simple model of duopoly with endogenous order of moves by including a pre-stage,
in which rms set and announce their wage rate. The model consists of two rms producing
horizontally dierentiated products using material (or capital) and labor. The rms can exibly
hire any number of workers in a perfectly competitive labor market at a market-clearing wage
rate or above. In the rst stage, rms simultaneously or sequentially publicize their wage rates.
In the second stage, rms simultaneously or sequentially compete on price or quantity, in which
the timing of moves in price or quantity setting is endogenously determined. We consider two
dierent approaches to determine which rm, ecient or inecient, will act as a leader in the
market competition, namely, endogenous-timing or auction-like approaches. The rst approach
is to employ the \observable delay" game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and the second one
is to compare the two rms' maximum willingness to pay for the preferred timing of moves. We
rst show that in either case, a rm committing to a higher wage will take the advantageous
second-mover position in subsequent price competition. In particular, in the endogenous-timing
approach, the situation where a more ecient rm leads and a less ecient rm follows is a
risk-dominant Nash equilibrium. Additionally, in the auction-like approach, a less ecient rm's
maximum willingness to pay for the position of the price-setting follower is greater than that
of a more ecient rm. Therefore, in a duopoly price competition, rms have an incentive to
pay more than the rival rm in order to commit to their high marginal cost and to prot from
second-mover advantage, given the rival rm's wage rate. The result that higher costs leads
to higher prots suggests the possibility that rms strategically oer higher wage rates even if
these do not increase worker productivity or eciency.
Second, we show that a simultaneous-move wage setting prior to price competition has a
cyclical best-response structure in which rms keep overbidding each other in wages until the
wage rate nears the point where it would be more protable to set the market-clearing (or
minimum) wages. Such overbidding can be seen as wage races to the top. We show that there
is no pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game. Sequential-move wage setting
yields a unique Nash equilibrium where a wage-setting leader oers wages that are way above
the market-clearing rate and a wage-setting follower oers market-clearing wage rates. Finally,
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considering a quantity competition model with endogenous timing of moves, we show that a
rm oering a higher wage will not have rst-mover advantages, implying that rms never have
an incentive to set a wage rate that is higher than the market-clearing one or a rival rm's one.
The main contributions of this study are twofold: First, this study is, as far as we know, the
rst attempt to model strategic pre-commitment to aect not only future competition but also
the endogenously determined order of moves in the competition. A large volume of literature has
investigated the endogenous timing of moves in various settings with price- and quantity-setting
duopoly (Hamilton and Slutsky 1990; Deneckere and Kovenock 1992; van Damme and Hurkens
1999, 2004; Amir and Stepanova 2006). Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) provide a novel analysis of
games of endogenous timing in duopoly games. Amir and Stepanova (2006) and van Damme and
Hurkens (2004) consider a price-setting duopoly model with endogenous timing and show that
the risk-dominant Nash equilibrium of the game is the outcome of sequential play with the more
ecient rm as price-setting leader and the less ecient rm as follower. However, these previous
studies do not consider the strategic behavior of rms to preempt the preferred order of moves
in price or quantity competition. Our study extends previous models by introducing a pre-stage
of wage setting into price and quantity competition and investigates the rms strategic incentive
to aect the endogenously determined order of moves in subsequent competition. Furthermore,
our study also considers a case in which the order of moves is determined by an auction-like
mechanism that compares the rms' willingness to pay for the preferred timing.
The second contribution of this study is that it introduces a mechanism of wage determination
into a duopoly model and provides a new theoretical rationale for why rms might pay their
employees a higher wage than the market-clearing rate. Even if higher wage rates do not enhance
worker productivity and even if the labor market is competitive, rms may have an incentive
to give their employees higher wages. Furthermore, our result can explain why wage dispersion
arises even if rms and workers are homogeneous. The wage dispersion between rms is the
result of strategic motives to win the preferred order of moves in competition. In particular,
our sequential wage-setting game yields an especially large wage dispersion in which one rm
chooses the high wage rate and the other, does the lowest one.1 We also show that the wage
premium that a wage-setting leader pays is greater when their products are more dierentiated
and/or when the rm has smaller marginal material costs than does its rival.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic framework of our model and
characterizes the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move and sequential-move price compe-
tition. We then consider two approaches to determine the endogenous timing of moves in price
competition and characterize the equilibrium in the simultaneous-move and sequential-move
1Many theoretical studies on frictional labor markets predict that wages can diverge among ex-ante homoge-
neous workers (e.g., Mortensen 1970; Lucas and Prescott 1974; Pissarides 1985; Mortensen and Pissarides 1994,
among many others). In these studies, the wage dispersion arises when workers do not know the wages oered by
all rms. See Mortensen (2005) for reviews of the theoretical and empirical examinations on this topic. Further-
more, our mechanism also diers from that of Ohnishi (2003, 2012). In his mechanism, a wage contract is one
where employees receive a wage premium if they can produce more than a certain output level. Such a contract
actually works as a commitment to produce a certain level of output before market competition. In contrast, our
wage contract is not conditional on production levels or worker productivities.
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wage setting. Section 3 considers the case of quantity competition instead of price competi-
tion. Section 4 briey mentions potential applications of our model to other contexts and draws
lessons for management strategy from the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model of Price Competition
Consider a continuum of consumers to be distributed uniformly on a Hotelling line segment [0; 1]
with mass 1.2 The location of an arbitrary consumer indexed by x 2 [0; 1] is associated with
his/her preferences. There are only two competing rms indexed by i = 1; 2 in this market. The
rms are located at either end of the unit interval, reecting horizontal product dierentiation:
Firm 1 is located at 0 and Firm 2 is located at 1. Each rm i sells a good i at a uniform price
pi. The utility of each consumer x is dened by
U(x) =
(
v   p1   t x if bought from Firm 1;
v   p2   t (1  x) if bought from Firm 2;
where v is the value of consumer x on his/her ideal product, and t x and t (1  x) are the costs
of buying a brand that is dierent from the consumer's ideal choice. Let x^ denote the marginal
consumer who is indierent between purchasing goods 1 and 2. Hence, we have
x^ =
  p1 + p2 + t
2t
:
Therefore, the demand for goods 1 and 2 are y1 = x^ and y2 = 1  x^.
Firm i's prots are given by i(pi; pj) = [pi   i(ci; wi)]yi, where i(ci; wi) is the marginal
cost for rm i and ci  0 is the marginal material (or capital) cost and wi 2 [w;1) is the
endogenously determined wage rate (or marginal labor cost) of rm i. The lower bound of
wage rate w corresponds to the market-clearing wage rate or the legal minimum wage rate.
We assume that rms have some market power in the product market, but not in the labor
market. Therefore, the rms can exibly hire any number of homogeneous workers in a perfectly
competitive labor market at w or above. For simplicity, we assume i(ci; wi)  ci+wi, implying
that one unit of material (or capital) and labor is needed to product one unit of product.3 We
treat the material costs as exogenous because they tend to be less exible in the short run
compared to the wage rates. The material costs can also be interpreted as the productivity or
production eciency of the rm. Here we call a rm that has smaller (larger) ci as a low-cost
(high-cost) rm. The wage rate is an endogenous variable that can be chosen freely by each rm,
unless the rate is below the market-clearing or minimum wage rate. We assume that high wages
do not improve worker productivity or eciency in production: wages are only transfers between
the employer and employees. However, the choice of wage rate can serve as a commitment; rms
2Although we use the simplest possible Hotelling model to examine price competition, the results obtained in
this study hold qualitatively, under certain assumptions, for more general demand structures such as the linear
demand with horizontal product dierentiation.
3All of our results hold qualitatively for more general continuous marginal cost function, as long as @i=@ci  0
and @i=@wi > 0.
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can obtain information about changes in the wage rates oered by other rms from, for example,
job magazines.
The timing of the game is as follows: in the rst stage of the game, each rm simultaneously
or sequentially sets/announces its wage rate. In the second stage, each rm simultaneously or
sequentially chooses its price. The timing of moves at the price-competition stage is determined
in the interim between the rst and second stages.
2.1 Simultaneous and sequential price-setting
First, we derive a second-stage Nash equilibrium in the case where prices are chosen simultane-
ously by both rms. Prot maximization yields the reaction functions given by
pi = Ri(pj)  (t+ i + pj)=2; (1)
which indicates that the price choices are strategic complements since R0i = 1=2 > 0. Solving
(1) characterizes the second-stage Nash equilibrium:
pNi =
3t+ 2i + j
3
; yNi =
3t  i + j
6t
; Ni =
(3t  i + j)2
18t
: (2)
The superscript N refers to the equilibrium variable in the simultaneous-move price competition
stage.
Second, we derive a second-stage equilibrium in the case where prices are chosen sequentially.
Let us assume that Firm 1 is a leader (L) and Firm 2 is a follower (F ) in choosing prices, which
we call Case LF. In this case, the reaction function of the follower rm (Firm 2) is the same
as (1), and the maximization problem for the leader rm (Firm 1) is maxp1 1 (p1; R2 (p1)). We
derive the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for Case LF as
pL1 =
3t+ 1 + 2
2
; pF2 =
5t+ 1 + 32
4
;
yL1 =
3t  1 + 2
8t
; yF2 =
5t+ 1   2
8t
;
L1 =
(3t  1 + 2)2
16t
; F2 =
(5t+ 1   2)2
32t
; (3)
where superscripts L and F are used to denote equilibrium variables in the second stage of leader
and follower, respectively. We nd that when j1   2j < 3t, yki > 0 holds for all i 2 f1; 2g and
k 2 fN;L; Fg, that is, the market is not monopolized.
The second-stage Nash equilibrium for Case FL, where Firm 1 is a follower and Firm 2 is a
leader in price setting, can be derived similarly.
2.2 Coordinating the timing of moves in price setting
Between the rst and second stages of the game, the order of moves in the subsequent price-
competition stage is determined endogenously. We consider two approaches to determine the
order of moves: one is to employ the \observable delay" game developed by Hamilton and
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F1nF2 Leads Follows
Leads N1 , 
N
2 
L
1 , 
F
2
Follows F1 , 
L
2 
N
1 , 
N
2
Table 1: Payo matrix of endogenous timing in the second stage
Slutsky (1990) and the other is what we call the auction-like approach, which compares the
maximum willingness to pay for the preferred timing of moves between rms. We then show
that the two dierent approaches yield qualitatively the same conclusion on the strategic nature
of wage contracts.
2.2.1 Risk dominance in an endogenous timing game
First, we derive the plausible timing of moves in price competition by applying the endogenous
timing (observable delay) game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).4 Firms are assumed to non-
cooperatively choose their preference between moving early or late in the subsequent stage:
if both rms choose to move early (strategy Leads) or to move late (strategy Follows), a
simultaneous-move price competition will be enforced in the second stage. If one rm chooses
Leads and the other chooses Follows, a sequential-move price competition will be enforced in
the second stage. Table 1 shows the normal form representation of the timing game.
Comparing Fi and 
L
i with 
N
i , we have
Fi   Ni =
(i   j + 3t) [27t  7 (i   j)]
288t
> 0; (4)
Li   Ni =
(3t  i + j)2
144t
> 0; (5)
where the inequality comes from the assumption of ji   j j < 3t. The best responses are
underlined in the payo matrix of Table 1. This proves that the (pure strategy) Nash equilibria
are fLeads; Followsg (Case LF) and fFollows; Leadsg (Case FL) in this endogenous timing
game.5
We then move on to the issue of coordination, i.e., the issue of how to select one of the two
possible Nash equilibria. Here we apply the concept of risk dominance criterion (Harsanyi and
4By employing the \action commitment" game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), van Damme and Hurkens
(1999, 2004) show that the low-cost rm will emerge as the endogenous leader in both quantity- and price-setting
duopoly situations. The action commitment game is quite dierent from the observable delay game used in our
study. See Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) on this point.
5In the Appendix, we present our derivation of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the endogenous timing
stage and show that a relatively high-cost rm is more likely to choose the strategy Leads than the low-cost rm.
This result is quite in contrast with the results obtained by using the risk dominance criterion and by comparing
the maximum willingness to pay for moving late described below. However, this mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
is unstable and is very unlikely to arise in practice because any small perturbation will lead to the breakdown of
the equilibrium. Therefore, we use a risk-dominance criterion to select a stable pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
6
Selten 1988).6 The equilibrium LF (Firm 1 leads and Firm 2 follows) risk dominates equilibrium
FL if the former is associated with the larger product of deviation losses .7 Specically, the
condition is:
   L1   N1   F2   N2   (F1   N1 )(L2   N2 ) > 0:
Using (2) and (3), we have
 =
h
15t2   (1   2)2
i
(2   1)
576t
> 0 , 1 < 2;
which indicates that the equilibrium LF is a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium if and only if
1 < 2: the situation where a low-cost rm leads and a high-cost rm follows is a risk-dominant
Nash equilibrium.8
2.2.2 Comparison of the maximum willingness to pay for moving late
Here, we take another approach, an auction-like approach, to determine the timing of moves
in price competition. When each rm prefers to determine its own price after the rival rm
has determined its price, the problem is which of the two rms can wait longer to set its price.
Consider the situation where a delay in pricing causes both rms the same amount of losses
(or opportunity costs) per unit of time. The rm whose benets from being the second mover
outweigh the losses from waiting, can wait longer. If both rms know that the benets of
becoming the second-mover for Firm 1 outweigh those for Firm 2, both rms can expect that,
at a future date, Firm 2 will be the rst to get impatient with waiting. In this case, Firm 2
does not have an incentive to wait and, thus, sets prices rst without any delay (at time 0).
Therefore, by comparing the rms' maximum willingness to pay for pricing late, we can identify
which rm can wait more on price setting. That is why we call this as an auction-like approach.
We already know from (4) and (5) that each rm strictly prefers the sequential-move rather
than the simultaneous-move price setting. In addition, from (2) and (3), we have
Fi   Li =
7t2 + 2t(i   j)  (i   j)2
32t
R 0 , i   j R  

2
p
2  1

t;
which implies that if Firm i's marginal costs are much smaller than Firm j, then Firm i prefers
to be a leader rather than a follower and Firm j prefers to be a follower. We immediately nd
that, in this case, a low-cost rm chooses to be a leader whereas a high-cost rm chooses to be
6There are some justications for why rms select a risk dominant Nash equilibrium. First, as shown in the
seminal paper by Kandori et al. (1993), evolutionary learning processes force equilibrium selection in accordance
with risk dominance. Second, as shown by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), iterated dominance in a global game
forces players to conform to the risk dominance criterion.
7Obviously, we cannot select one risk-dominant Nash equilibrium if the rms choose their wage rate such that
1 = 2 (or w1 + c1 = w2 + c2) in the rst stage of the game. However, no rm will choose its wage rate such
that 1 = 2 in the rst stage as shown in Section 2.3.
8Similar results are obtained by van Damme and Hurkens (2004) and Amir and Stepanova (2006). They show
that a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium of the timing game of Bertrand price competition (not a Hotelling model of
price competition as in our study) is sequential play with the low-cost (or ecient) rm as a price-setting leader.
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a follower. On the other hand, if the dierence between 1 and 2 is smaller than
 
2
p
2  1 t,
then both rms prefer to be a follower. Then, the amount that Firm i would be willing to pay
for the position of price-setting follower is bi  Fi   Li . We have
b1   b2 = 1   2
8
> 0 , 1 > 2;
which implies that the high-cost rm can wait more than the low-cost rm to become a second-
mover (follower) in price competition: if both rms know b1 > b2, which means that Firm 1 can
wait more than Firm 2, then Firm 2 plunges into moving rst because waiting only causes losses.9
As a result, the situation where a low-cost rm becomes a leader and a high-cost rm becomes
a follower is a plausible equilibrium.10 Incidentally, the result that a more impatient (weaker)
player immediately concedes also corresponds to the unique equilibrium of an asymmetric \war
of attrition" game.11
Then we have the following result for the coordination of the timing of moves.
Result 1
In our Hotelling price competition model, the situation in which a low-cost rm becomes a price-
setting leader and a high-cost rm becomes a price-setting follower is (i) a risk-dominant Nash
equilibrium of the endogenous timing game, and (ii) a plausible equilibrium when the delay of
pricing can cause losses for both rms.
2.3 Wage setting in the rst stage
In the rst stage, each rm non-cooperatively chooses wi 2 [w;1), where the lower limit w is
the market-clearing wage or minimum wage rate. We rst show that there is no pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous wage-setting stage. Then, we investigate the equilibrium
of sequential wage setting and show that either rm oers wages that exceed the market-clearing
level to preempt the second-mover position in price competition.
9This coordination mode, for example, corresponds to a situation where two rms are considering the best
timing to run advertising on their product prices.
10If the rms chooses their wage rate such that 1 = 2 (i.e., c1+w1 = c2+w2), then we have b1 = b2, implying
that we cannot identify which rm will be a price-setting leader or follower. However, such case never be an
equilibrium in the rst stage.
11The auction-like approach we consider here is a variant of the \War of Attrition" which has many economic
applications such as the study of rm exit (Ghemawat and Nalebu, 1985; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986). In a war
of attrition model with complete information, there are multiple equilibria with an instant exit of one player and
equilibria involving constant hazard-rate exit. However, as shown by Kornhauser et al. (1989), an asymmetric
war of attrition that includes a specic irrational strategy for each player yields a unique equilibrium in which
a weaker player instantly concedes at the beginning of the game. Myatt (2005) also shows such a result of an
instant exit of an \ex-ante" weaker player. In our model, a more impatient player who has a lower willingness to
pay for waiting is a low-cost rm, implying the low-cost rm will instantly concede at the beginning of the price
competition when we apply the model of Kornhauser et al. (1989) and Myatt (2005).
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2.3.1 Simultaneous wage setting
We rst consider the case in which each rm simultaneously chooses its wage rate in the rst stage
of the game. Hereafter, we denote the second-stage equilibrium prots of rm i for k 2 fN;L; Fg
as ki (wi;wj), in which the rst element is the rm's own wage rate and the second, the rival's
wage rate.
Let us derive each rm's best responses to its rival's wage. As we already know from Result
1, rms expect that a relatively high-cost rm will become a follower in the price competition
stage. When Firm j chooses wj , Firm i can become a follower by setting w
0
i  wj + cj   ci + 
such that i > j , where  is an arbitrary small positive value. Hereafter, we call the strategy
for choosing w0i the wage overbidding. From (3), the associated prots are given by
lim
!0
Fi
 
w0i;wj

=
25t
32
; (6)
for any wj  w. When Firm i sets its wage rates such that wi < wj + cj   ci, then Firm i
becomes a leader in the price competition stage. In that case, Firm i's best strategy is choosing
w, the lowest possible wage rate, because setting wi 2 (w; wj + cj   ci) simply increases the
marginal production costs and provides no benets to the rm. Therefore, the associated prots,
for any wj  w, are given by
Li (w
;wj) =
[3t  w + wj   (ci   cj)]2
16t
: (7)
Comparing (6) with (7), we nd that Firm i's best response is to choose
wi =
(
wj + cj   ci +  for wj < wj ;
w for wj  wj ;
(8)
where
wj  w +

5
p
2  6

t=2 + (ci   cj): (9)
Equation (8) implies that Firm i chooses wage overbidding when the rival's wages are lower
than the threshold rate wj and chooses the market-clearing wage rate when the rival's wages
are higher than wj .
Now we have the following result:
Result 2
In the simultaneous wage-setting stage, there does not exist a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: We prove the case in which marginal material costs are the same (c1 = c2). From the best
response functions (8), if rms start with the market clearing wage w, then each rm initially
has an incentive to set its wage rate that exceeds its rival's to have the second-mover position in
subsequent price competition. However, (8) and (9) indicate that once one rm's (say Firm 1's)
wage rate reaches a threshold wage w1, it is more protable for Firm 2 to set the lower-bound
wage rate (a market clearing wage w) than to overbid it. Then, Firm 1 responds by overbidding
Firm 2. This completes the cycle. Therefore, there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We
9
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Figure 1: Reaction functions in wage setting: the cases of c1 = c2 (left) and c1 > c2 (right)
can immediately see that there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the case of asymmetric
marginal material costs (c1 6= c2), as depicted in the right panel of Figure 1. 
Figure 1 illustrates the reaction functions in the case of c1 = c2 and c1 > c2. We can see
from the gure that the reaction function of Firm i is upward-sloping over the rival's wage
wj 2 [w; wj) and at over wj 2 [ wj ;1). For w1 2 [w; w1] and w2 2 [w; w2], each rm has a
strategic incentive to set its wage rate above that of the rival's to gain the advantageous order
of moves in price competition, implying the wage race to the top. However, once rm j sets
the threshold wage rate wj , another rm i chooses to w
, so the wage rates evolve in cycles like
Edgeworth cycles (Edgeworth 1925).12 Because their reaction functions have no intersections,
this indicates there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in this game.13
2.3.2 Sequential wage setting
As shown above, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the case of simultaneous wage
setting. Here, we consider a sequential wage setting in the rst stage in order to investigate
rms' incentives to oer wages that exceed a market-clearing level. Without loss of generality,
we assume c1 > c2, that is, Firm 1 has higher marginal material costs than Firm 2.
First, we consider a case where Firm 1 (a high-cost rm) chooses its wage rate rst, and
then Firm 2 chooses its wage rate after observing Firm 1's choice. If Firm 2 chooses w after
observing w1, then Firm 2 must become a rst-mover in subsequent price competition for any
12Edgeworth (1925) shows that there exists no price equilibrium in pure strategy when two rms face capacity
constraints. He predicts a pattern of cycling in price over time. If rms start with a high price (e.g., monopoly
price), then each rm has an incentive to undercut its rival's price. The undercutting continues until the war
becomes too costly, at which point one rm increases its price. Then, the prices fall again. For more discussion
on the Edgeworth cycle, see Maskin and Tirole (1988).
13Not surprisingly, there exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which rms randomize over wages: a mixed
strategy equilibrium that consists of a pair of probability distributions over wi 2 [w; wi] with the property that
any strategy chosen with positive probability must be optimal against the rival's probability mixture. Derivation
for the mixed strategy equilibrium is beyond our scope here.
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w1 2 [w;1) because c1 > c2. The associated prots are
L2 (w
;w1) =
(3t+ w1   w + c1   c2)2
16
:
If Firm 2 chooses wage overbidding, w02 = w1 + c1   c2 + , then 1 < 2 holds and Firm 2 will
preempt a second-mover position in the subsequent price competition. The associated prots
are
lim
!0
F2 (w
0
2;w1) =
25t
32
:
Comparing them yields
L2 (w
;w1)  lim
!0
F2 (w
0
2;w1) > 0 , w1 > w +

5
p
2  6

t=2  (c1   c2) = w1:
If Firm 1 sets its wage rate w1 higher than w1, then Firm 2 has no incentives to overbid and
sets w2 at the market-clearing rate w
. Notice that if (c1   c2) >
 
5
p
2  6 t=2, then w1 < w
necessarily holds, indicating that Firm 2 has no incentive to overbid even when Firm 1 oers
the lowest wage w.
Now we investigate Firm 1's choice. If Firm 1 sets w1 = w1 + , then Firm 2 will give up
overbidding the wage and set w2 = w
. In this case, Firm 1 will become a follower in the price
competition stage. This yields the payo
lim
!0
F1 ( w1 + ;w
) =
 
16  5p22 t
128
: (10)
If Firm 1 sets its wage at the lowest possible rate, w, Firm 2 will overbid it. In this case, Firm
1's prots are
lim
!0
L1 (w
;w02) =
9t
16
: (11)
Comparing (10) with (11) yields 
16  5p22 t
128
  9t
16
=
 
117  80p2 t
64
> 0;
which indicates that by setting w1 = w1 + , which discourages Firm 2 from overbidding, it is
benecial for Firm 1 if (c1   c2) <
 
5
p
2  6 t=2. In the case of (c1   c2)   5p2  6 t=2,
it holds that w1 < w
, implying that Firm 1 chooses w. Therefore, we have the following
proposition on the equilibrium of this sequential-move wage setting stage.
Result 3
Suppose c1 > c2. If Firm 1 can set its wage rate rst, the equilibrium is characterized by
(w1; w2) =
(
( w1 + ; w
) for (c1   c2) <
 
5
p
2  6 t=2;
(w; w) for (c1   c2) 
 
5
p
2  6 t=2;
where w1 = w
 +
 
5
p
2  6 t=2  (c1   c2).
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Second, we consider a case in which Firm 2 (a more ecient rm) is a wage-setting leader.
The best response of Firm 1 (the wage-setting follower) against w2 is to overbid 2 by setting
w01 = w2 + c2   c1 +  or to set the market-clearing wage rate w. Comparing them yields
F1 (w
0
1;w2)  L1 (w;w2) =
25t
32
  (3t+ w2   w
   c1 + c2)2
16t
R 0
, w2 Q w +

5
p
2  6

t=2 + c1   c2 = w2;
which indicates that if Firm 2 sets w2 higher than w2, then Firm 1 chooses not to overbid it and
sets w1 = w
.
Next, we check the protability of Firm 2. If Firm 2 sets w2 = w2 + , then Firm 1 chooses
w1 = w
. The associated prots for Firm 2 are
lim
!0
F2 ( w2 + ;w
) =
 
16  5p22 t
128
: (12)
If Firm 2 sets w2 = w
, then Firm 1 just has to choose w1 = w to preempt the price-setting
follower's position and, therefore, Firm 2 becomes a price-setting leader in price competition.
The associated prots are
L2 (w
;w) =
(3t+ c1   c2)2
16t
: (13)
Comparing (12) with (13) yields 
16  5p22 t
128
  (3t+ c1   c2)
2
16t
=
 
153  80p2 t2   4 (3t+ c1   c2)2
64t
R 0
, (c1   c2) Q

8
p
2  11

t=2:
Result 4
Suppose c1 > c2. If Firm 2 can set its wage rate rst, the equilibrium is characterized by
(w1; w2) =
(
(w; w2 + ) for (c1   c2) <
 
8
p
2  11 t=2;
(w; w) for (c1   c2) 
 
8
p
2  11 t=2;
where w2 = w
 +
 
5
p
2  6 t=2 + c1   c2.
The two results indicate that if the dierence in the marginal material costs between rms
is small (or if the productivity gap between rms is small), the wage-setting leader strategically
chooses a wage rate that is higher than the market-clearing one to preempt the second-mover
position in the subsequent price competition, whereas the wage-setting follower chooses the
market-clearing wage rate. In other words, substantial wage dispersion arises if rms have
strategic motives in setting their wage rate. Notice that such wage dispersion does not stem from
the sequential choices in wage rate: if the timing of moves in price competition are exogenously
given, both the wage-setting leader and the follower choose w.
From Results 3 and 4, we nd w1 < w2 for c1 > c2 and @ wi=@t > 0 for i = 1; 2. Now we have
the following results on wage premium that a wage-setting leader oers.
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Result 5
The wage premium that would be required for a more ecient rm to discourage the less ecient
rival rm from overbidding is larger than that for a less ecient rm. Furthermore, the more
dierentiated the products are, the higher is the wage premium that a wage-setting leader oers.
Therefore, the wage dispersion between rms widens as products are dierentiated. The
intuition is simple. If the products are homogenous (t = 0), price competition leads to marginal
cost pricing, implying that the second-mover advantages vanish. Because the second-mover
advantage (Fi   Li ) is an increasing function in t, the wage-setting leader can pay higher
wages for its employees to preempt the advantageous position as t increases. As is obvious, if
t is extremely large, the market would not be fully covered and both rms would be locally
monopolistic, setting a minimum wage rate.
Two caveats are necessary. First, although our results indicate that a wage-setting leader
has strategic incentives to oer wages that exceed a market-clearing level in order to preempt
the position of the second mover in price competition, the prots of the wage-setting follower
are necessarily greater than those of the wage-setting leader. Dening the wage-setting leader's
and follower's prots in the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium as WLi and 
WF
i , respectively,
we can conrm that from
WL1   WF2 =

F1 ( w1;w
)  L2 (w; w1)

=  
 
80
p
2  103 t
64
< 0; (14)
where the rst bracket represents the dierence of prots between rms when Firm 1 is a
wage-setting leader and sets its wage at w1 (in this case, Firm 1 becomes the follower in the
subsequent price competition) and the second bracket represents the dierence of prots when
Firm 2 is a wage-setting leader and sets its wage at w2. This indicates that a rm that pays
w (a wage-setting follower) realizes greater prots than the rival rm that pays more than
the market-clearing wage because of its smaller total marginal costs. Also, this result holds for
asymmetric material costs between rms.
Second, we do not explicitly consider which rm would be a wage-setting leader or follower.
As we can see from (14), the wage-setting leader who commits to higher wages loses, implying
both rms want to be a wage-setting follower. Therefore, as in price competition, rms prefer to
move late in their wage announcement. Which rm can wait more? Unfortunately, we cannot
answer that question in our model. The reasons are (i) the simultaneous-move wage setting
has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, which implies that we cannot model the coordination
in timing of moves in the wage-setting stage by employing the endogenous timing game; (ii)
each rm's maximum willingness to pay for moving late for wage setting is the same even under
asymmetric marginal material costs:
WF1   WL1 = WF2   WL2 = (80
p
2  103)t=64:
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3 The Model of Quantity Competition
This section investigates the case in which rms compete on quantity (not price) in the second
stage, and shows that neither rm has an incentive to oer wages that exceed a market-clearing
level under quantity competition.
Consider two rms i 2 f1; 2g producing homogeneous products with a linear inverse demand
P = 1   Y1   Y2, where Yi is Firm i's output. Prots are i = (P   i)Yi, where i  ci + wi
is the total marginal costs, ci is the marginal material costs, and wi is the wage rate for Firm i.
The structure of the game is the same as before except for the second stage.
After some manipulations, we easily obtain the second-stage equilibrium in the simultaneous-
move quantity competition as
Y Ni =
1  2i + j
3
; Ni =

1  2i + j
3
2
;
and that in the sequential-move quantity competition as
Y Li =
1  2i + j
2
; Y Fi =
1  3i + 2j
4
; Li =
(1  2i + j)2
8
; Fi =
(1  3i + 2j)2
16
;
where the superscript N refers to the variable in the equilibrium of simultaneous-move quan-
tity competition, the superscripts L and F refer to the leader's and follower's variable in the
equilibrium of sequential-move quantity competition.
As before, we consider two approaches to determine the timing of moves: endogenous timing
(observable delay) and auction-like approaches. First, we immediately nd that the simultaneous-
move timing is the unique Nash equilibrium of the endogenous timing game because Li > 
N
i >
Fi and therefore, the strategy Leads is the dominant strategy for both rms. Second, we con-
sider an auction-like approach that compares bids for the right to preferred order of moves.
Because the rst mover has an advantage in the sequential quantity competition game, each
rm bids for the right to rst-mover position of the rst mover. In that case, Firm i's maximum
willingness to bid to move rst is Bi = L  F . Then we have
B1  B2 = (2  1   2) (2   1)
16
> 0 , 1 < 2;
which indicates that the maximum willingness to pay for moving rst of a relatively low-cost
rm is greater than that of a high-cost rm. In other words, a low-cost rm can bid o the right
to move rst and enjoy rst-mover advantages.
In the rst stage, each rm chooses its wage rate. We can immediately see that none of
the rms has an incentive to raise its wage rate for both second-stage rationales of endogenous-
timing and bidding for the preferred order of moves. If the order of moves is decided through
endogenous timing, a simultaneous-move situation is a Nash equilibrium irrespective of the
relative magnitudes of 1 and 2, Thus, neither rm has an incentive to raise its marginal costs
because @Ni =@i < 0, 8i 2 f1; 2g. If the order of moves is decided by an auction-like mechanism,
as we have already shown, a low-cost rm will have the advantageous leader's position in quantity
competition. Therefore, in the rst stage, both rms oer the market-clearing wage rates because
raising wage rates never aects the order of moves in quantity competition.
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Result 6
In quantity competition under duopoly, none of the rms has strategic incentives to set wage
rates that are higher than the market-clearing rates.
4 Discussion
In this section, we briey discuss several commitment strategies, other than wage commitment,
for duopoly rms. Then, we explain why we focus on the wage contract as a commitment
strategy by stating our belief in the superiority of it. Finally, we draw lessons for management
strategy from our research.
Our results raise the theoretical possibility of oering higher wages as a means of winning an
advantageous position in future competition. The important point here is that wage increases
can serve as a commitment to higher total marginal costs than the rival rm's. From this
aspect, other commitment strategies that aect future marginal costs may work as well. The
rst possible strategy is to engage in costly corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, such
as contributing a certain ratio of the total sales to a charity or paying \fair" wages to employees.
Our results indicate that rms may engage in such strategic CSR activities even when these
activities do not enhance brand image, customer satisfaction, or employee morale.
The second possible strategy is for rms to locate their plants far from the market (consuming
area) to commit to their future high shipping costs. The strategy could be superior to the costly
CSR activities in its ability to commit because the location choices are long-term commitments
and cannot be reversed easily. Consider a case in which a rm incurs shipping costs that are
proportional to the distance between its plants and the market center. Then, we can apply our
model by interpreting wi as rm i's shipping cost, instead of wage rate. Our results suggest that
if the duopoly rms decide their plant locations sequentially and then compete on price, the rm
setting up its plant rst (the leader) chooses its plant location far from the market to commit
to future high shipping costs and preempt the second-mover advantages in price competition.
However, the rm setting up its plant second (the follower) chooses its plant location as close as
possible to the market to save shipping costs, implying geographic dispersion of plant locations.
On the contrary, if the duopoly rms compete in output (or capacity), both rms choose their
plant location as close as possible to the market, implying geographic agglomeration of plant
locations.
The third possible strategy for rms revolved around the adoption of more ecient production
technologies. As shown in this study, having lower marginal production costs than a rival rm
may give the rival an advantageous position in future price competition. Therefore, rms may
intentionally go for lower technologies than their rivals or not update their production equipment
even if more ecient production technologies are available to rms without any additional costs.
Although there are several strategies for preempting the advantageous position in future
competition, as listed above, the strategy of setting higher wages can be the most eective and
credible. This is because the wage contract (or announcement) is (i) a legally binding agreement
between employers and employees (the third-party players) and therefore cannot be rescinded
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unilaterally, and (ii) is usually publicly observable to all, including the rival rm, through job
information magazines or websites.
Our results may have several managerial implications in duopoly. First, managements fac-
ing price competition in the product market should determine wages after the rival rm does
so. If the rival pays fairly low wages, the management can enjoy second-mover advantages in
subsequent price competition for a small sacrice by paying slightly higher wages such that its
marginal costs outweigh those of the rival. In contrast, the rival may pay signicantly higher
wages to preempt the advantageous position in subsequent price competition. In that case,
the management should oer the lowest possible wages because of the large benet of cost re-
duction. Second, the management facing quantity competition in the product market should
determine the lowest possible wages because it cannot have the advantageous order of moves in
the competition by oering a high-wage contract.
5 Concluding Remarks
There are many theoretical studies of endogenous timing that examine whether duopoly rms
move simultaneously or sequentially in a quantity/price competition and what types of rms
would be a leader or follower. Taking a further step, we examine what strategic actions the rms
would take to preempt the advantageous order of moves in future competition if they understand
the mechanisms of such studies. We have focused on wage contracts as commitment devices. We
have shown that in price competition under duopoly, rms have an incentive to set higher wage
rates than the market-clearing rates in order to have the advantageous order of moves in price
competition. This arises when the dierence in marginal production costs between rms is not
too large. Our ndings provide a theoretical rationale for why rms might pay their employees
higher wages even if the wage increase does not enhance worker productivity and why wage
dispersion arises even if rms and workers are homogeneous.
We have considered strategic actions by the player himself to guarantee an advantageous
position in future competition. Future research should also consider such strategic actions by
third-party players. For example, consider the strategic trade policy model of Brander and
Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986), in which a domestic rm and a foreign rm
compete on price in a third market; both the domestic government may have an incentive to
impose higher export taxes on its domestic rm than the foreign government, not only for
causing each rm to export less but also for preempting an advantageous timing of moves in
price competition. For another example, consider a case in which a domestic rm and a foreign
rm compete on price in the domestic market. In this case, the domestic government usually has
an incentive to impose a tari on imports (foreign rm's product) with exogenous order of moves
in market competition. However, if the order of moves is endogenous, the domestic government
may have an incentive to subsidize imports in order to give the domestic rm second-mover
advantage in price competition.
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the endogenous timing game
studied in Section 2.2.1 (see Table 1). Let i and 1  i be the probability that rm i chooses
Leads and Follows, respectively. In the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, the probability is
obtained as
i =
2(3t+ i   j)2
99t2 + 6t(i   j)  5(i   j)2 :
Then, we have
1   2 =
144t

15t2   (1   2)2

(1   2)
[99t2 + 6t(1   2)  5(1   2)] [99t2   6t(1   2)  5(1   2)] ;
which implies 1  2 for 1  2. In the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the endogenous
timing stage, the relatively high-cost rm is more likely to choose strategy Leads than is the
relatively low-cost rm. However, the equilibrium is unstable. Therefore, we use the risk-
dominance criterion for selecting a stable pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the main body.
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